The strange career of Commodore Frank Bainimarama’s 2006 Fiji coup by Lal, Brij
Crown colony. The policies that the colonial gov-
ernment enunciated at the time had the overall 
effect of creating a racially segregated society in 
which each of the three principal ethnic groups 
— the Fijians, the Indo-Fijians and the Europe-
ans — had their own distinctive understandings of 
their place in the larger scheme of things. Fijians 
assumed, or were encouraged to assume, that in 
the governance of the colony their interests would 
remain paramount. Indo-Fijians, invoking promises 
made by both the imperial and the colonial govern-
ments, sought parity with other groups. And the 
Europeans claimed privilege on account of their 
preponderant contribution to the colonial economy 
and ethnic and cultural affinity with the ruling elite. 
The position hardened as independence approached 
in the 1960s, with the threat of violence made peri-
odically to maintain the racially segregated order.
The essential features of that order were 
entrenched in the Independence Constitution 
of 1970 by the political leaders of the three 
communities. They were never put to referendum 
or even an election but adopted after a feel-good 
debate in the House of Representatives (Lal 2006). 
Fiji had a mix of racial and cross-racial seats whose 
logic dictated an appeal for unity in one’s own 
community and fragmentation in the opposition’s 
sufficient to form government. Fijian victory would 
be assured if Fijians remained politically united 
with the support of an over-represented European 
group, which the fear of ‘Indian dominance’ 
ensured. For a while, the formula worked. The 
mood in the immediate post-independence period 
was celebratory. Fiji was a ‘symbol of hope to the 
world’, Pope John Paul II had intoned 
during a fleeting visit in 1986, which 
eventually morphed into the national 
slogan ‘Fiji: The Way the World 
Should Be’.
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Five December 2006 may well go down in the 
annals of modern Fijian history as the date when 
the country dramatically changed course — a turn-
ing point when the country finally turned. What 
the future holds for that ill-fated island nation state 
is not at all clear, nor likely to be for some time, 
but it is now surely beyond dispute that the 20th 
century, with its assumptions and understandings 
about the nature and structure of Fiji’s political 
culture, effectively ended not in 2000, but in 2006 
when Commodore Bainimarama executed his mili-
tary coup. The break with the past is decisive and 
irreversible. An improbable coup has largely suc-
ceeded in destroying the foundations of the old 
order, and a new one is promised to ‘take the coun-
try  forward’. That promise for now remains just 
that: a promise. Everyone accepts that a race-based 
electoral system is counterproductive for a multi-
ethnic democratic society, that gender inequality 
is indefensible, that all citizens should have equal 
rights, that citizenship should be race neutral. 
Change in a society, as in any living organism, is 
inevitable, constant, though it is more easily assert-
ed than  effected. But the larger question is change 
for what purpose? To what end, at what pace, on 
whose terms, under what conditions, through what 
means, at what price? This is the conundrum at the 
heart of the current political debate in Fiji. I will 
not attempt to answer these questions here. My 
purpose is not to speculate about what Fiji’s future 
might look like under Bainimarama, but to under-
stand the constellation of forces that served to con-
solidate the Commodore’s coup. This, I hope, may 
provide us with some pointers for the future. 
Origins of the Crisis
The roots of Fiji’s political turbulence in the late 
20th century reach back to the origins of its mod-
ern history in 1874, when Fiji became a British 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm2                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Brij V. Lal
In truth, things were not as rosy. None of the 
underlying problems about the nature of power-
sharing among the different communities, the 
kind of political culture Fiji needed to have for its 
multiethnic population, whether a racial electoral 
system should continue, or the terms and condi-
tions of leasing agricultural land, were resolved, 
but brushed aside by a government entrenched in 
power and likely to remain so for a long time (Lal 
1992). The logic of racial politics inevitably dic-
tated the political process. In time, unsurprisingly, 
every issue of public policy, whether affirmative 
action in the allocation of tertiary scholarships, 
appointments to or promotion in the civil service, 
in diplomatic postings, and the deployment of 
development aid, came to be viewed through the 
prism of ethnic interests. Fijians demanded a big-
ger share of government largesse on the supposed 
grounds of being the more disadvantaged com-
munity, while the Indo-Fijians asked for a fairer 
share of state resources based on need rather than 
ethnicity. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the two 
ethnic groups were not as homogenous as they had 
been portrayed to be, divided by class and regional 
interests. Disadvantage stalked Fijian and Indo-Fiji-
an communities in roughly equal measure. Public 
perceptions and policies were markedly at variance 
with the reality on the ground.
Race was only one of the facts of life, not the 
fact of life as the leading politicians of the day pro-
claimed from the self-created safety of their ethnic 
compartments. But racial politics became the order 
of the day, with Fijians determined not to relin-
quish or even equitably share power. Tension sim-
mered beneath the surface, threatening to erupt at 
election times. The signs of imminent rupture were 
visible throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Lal 1992). 
They were there when Sakiasi Butadroka launched 
his ‘Fiji for Fijians’ Fijian Nationalist Party with its 
platform to deport all Fiji Indians to India. They 
were visible in the manufactured constitutional 
crisis of April 1977 when the ruling Alliance Party 
temporarily lost power to the National Federation 
Party because of a split in the indigenous Fijian 
communal vote. They were lurking beneath the 
surface in 1982 when the Opposition came close to 
winning power, leading the Great Council of Chiefs 
(GCC) to demand Fijian control of government. 
They came to the fore in May 1987 when a demo-
cratically elected Labour Coalition government 
was ousted in a military coup with the quiet sup-
port of the luminaries of the Fijian establishment. 
They were present in the 1990 constitution, which 
put political power back in the hands of the Fiji-
ans. They were present on the sullen faces of many 
nationalist-leaning Fijian parliamentarians who 
voted for the 1997 constitution and then promptly 
orchestrated campaign against it. And they were 
there in 2000 when George Speight attempted his 
improbable putsch, which deposed another Labour 
Coalition government. Throughout the 1990s, as 
in the 1960s, the battle lines were drawn between 
those who wanted the political architecture of Fiji 
to reflect indigenous concerns and aspirations 
entrenched in the constitution, and those who 
favoured a more democratic, inclusionary model of 
non-racial polity. Fiji was revisiting the unresolved 
debates of the earlier decades. Commodore Baini-
marama promises finally to close the door on the 
obsessive and enormously counterproductive racial 
politics of the past.
The Transformation Scene
Fiji on the eve of the 2006 coup was a very different 
place to what it had been in 1987. The changes had 
a direct bearing on the fate of the Bainimarama 
coup. Among the factors that changed the funda-
mental character of the broader Fiji society was 
the demographic transformation in the country. 
In 1987, Indo-Fijians were around 49 per cent of 
the total population, but since then the percentage 
has declined substantially because of a continuing 
lower birth rate and increased emigration. Now, 
they are around 33 per cent of the population, and 
declining. Any Indo-Fijian who can leave will leave. 
That is the incontrovertible truth about contempo-
rary Fiji. Indigenous Fijians (iTaukei) on the other 
hand, are now closer to 60 per cent of the popu-
lation, and confident of continued demographic 
dominance. With the changed demographic equa-
tion has forever disappeared the threat of ‘Indian 
domination’ that cast such a dark shadow over 
political debate in Fiji for much of the 20th century. 
The ‘wolves at the door’ syndrome is dead. The 
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second important consequence of the change is the 
opening up of space for democratic debate within 
Fijian society itself about issues once considered 
taboo: the relevance of the chiefly system, its privi-
leges and priorities, its role in the modern political 
arena, about the distribution of power, about the 
barriers and boundaries that kept people apart. It 
is a change with profound implications both for 
indigenous Fijians as well as for Fiji. 
The years leading up to the 2006 were unhappy 
ones for Indo-Fijians. Governments elected with 
their support were deposed, not once but twice. 
They faced the wrath of militant Fijian nationalists 
(in the Taukei Movement, for example, led by 
Apisai Tora and Inoke Kubuabola), the religious 
extremism of the Methodist Church led by Manasa 
Lasaro, Viliame Gonelevu and Tomasi Raikivi, 
among others. They were deprived of fundamental 
human rights in the 1990 constitution and in the 
racially discriminatory programs that flowed from 
it. Sitiveni Rabuka, many felt, was bad enough, 
even though he had publicly apologised for his 
actions in 1987and helped bring about a fairer, 
democratic constitution in 1997. But Laisenia 
Qarase, eventually deposed by Commodore 
Bainimarama, was not much better. Though a 
well-educated man and long-term head of the 
Fiji Development Bank, he extended the scope of 
the racially discriminatory policies of affirmative 
action in his so-called ‘Fijian Blueprint’, let his 
ministers go un-reprimanded for making racially 
provocative speeches in parliament (one of them, 
Asenaca Caucau, called Indo-Fijians ‘noxious 
weeds’) and gave the overall impression of caring 
little about non-Fijians. In his second term, with an 
eye on the verdict of history, he changed, became 
more inclusive and gave the Labour Party senior 
portfolios under the power sharing provisions 
of the 1997 constitution. But by then it was too 
late: the cup of Indo-Fijian disillusionment was 
overflowing. Among those most deeply embittered 
by Qarase’s reign were Indo-Fijians who had left 
Fiji. They never forgave him. Instead, they looked 
to Commodore Bainimarama to right the wrongs 
of the past and supported his military adventure.
Those Indo-Fijians who remained in Fiji were 
trapped in despair and hopelessness, disillusioned 
by the bitter wrangling of heightened racial politics 
of which they were at the receiving end. Many agri-
cultural leases that began to expire under the Agri-
cultural Landlord and Tenant Act were not renewed, 
the formerly productive farm land reverting to bush 
(Lal, P.N. 2008). Some Fijian landowners wanted 
to enter commercial agriculture themselves, but 
other leases were not renewed for political reasons 
as a punishment for Indo-Fijians’ refusal to accept 
Fijian political paramountcy. The idea that land 
was power — Fijian power — was well understood 
and opportunistically deployed. Whole areas in the 
sugar belt emptied. Most displaced tenants searched 
for a place in the mushrooming squatter settle-
ments fringing urban centres, looking for jobs and 
opportunities rare even at the best of times. This is 
where around 15 to 20 per cent of Fiji’s population 
lives, most below the poverty line. Among the poor-
est people in Fiji are landless Indo-Fijian labourers. 
Given their predicament, it is understandable why 
they responded to Commodore Bainimarama’s call 
to end corruption in Fiji and chart a new course. 
Many are belatedly realising that little has changed 
in the new regime: the cast of characters is differ-
ent, but the overall pattern of things is the same. But 
Bainimarama is still their man, their buffer against a 
whole variety of forces arrayed against them, includ-
ing the wrath of iTaukei nationalists. That unspoken 
fear is a powerful cementer of support behind the 
regime. But how long will Fjian power shield Indo-
Fijians and others from Fijian nationalists? Sooner 
rather than later, the realisation will dawn that 
democracy and the rule of law rather than the mili-
tary is the best guarantor of citizens’ rights. 
Indigenous Fijian society was similarly undergo-
ing profound social and economic changes in the 
1980s and 1990s. Geographer Gerard Ward writes: 
The contradiction in native Fijian village 
economy and life are far more marked in the 
mid-1980s than in the mid-1960s. The choice 
in favour of change has probably been made 
already, even if unconsciously in most cases. 
The test will be whether or not the social and 
political attitudes and policies can change 
quickly enough to keep up. If the coherence of 
native Fijian society and its hierarchical struc-
ture is a pillar of native Fijian political and eco-
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nomic systems, it is a pillar whose foundations 
and inherent strength are being weakened to 
an extent which is not always recognized by 
politicians or planners (Ward 1987, 45). 
On the contrary, Fijian political leaders and 
their advisors were still refurbishing the old system, 
trying to stem the tide of change against archaic 
structures whose time had long passed.
By the early 2000s, the urban drift was moving 
apace, with nearly 40 per cent of indigenous Fijians 
living in urban or peri-urban areas, exposed to all 
its challenges and opportunities. A more modern-
minded Fijian middle class of self-made men 
and women was beginning to emerge, ironically 
benefiting from the affirmative action policies 
of previous Fijian governments. Fijian children 
were attending so-called ‘Indian’ schools, such as 
Suva Sangam, Suva Muslim High, Indian College, 
Mahatma Gandhi Memorial and others in larger 
numbers than ever before, even though the Qarase 
government was providing special assistance to 
only Fijian-designated schools. This was a far 
cry from the days when Fijian children attended 
only designated indigenous Fijian schools for 
fear of losing their culture and in response to 
various incentives provided by organs of the Fiji 
Administration. The break with the past was not 
abrupt, but there was sufficient movement to 
indicate a gradual shift to a new way of life in a new 
environment. Many in this group were now ready 
to listen to the empowering rhetoric Commodore 
Bainimarama employed when he took over.
Gerard Ward referred to the hierarchical struc-
ture of the native Fijian society. That structure, as 
O.H.K. Spate pointed out as early as 1959, was fast 
losing its relevance in the face of modern challenges 
(Spate 1959, 6–7). It had had its uses in the past, 
providing guidance and leadership to a people liv-
ing in the rural subsistence sector and effectively 
isolated from the broader social and economic envi-
ronment, but had become a burden when borders 
and boundaries of Fijian society were becoming 
porous and all too often transgressed with impunity. 
The chiefs were losing their role as the gatekeepers 
of their people, and many lacked the skills to make 
them relevant to the requirements of the modern 
age influenced by forces of change fundamentally 
beyond their comprehension. When Commodore 
Bainimarama pushed them aside and abolished the 
GCC altogether, there were obligatory murmurs 
in protest, but its disbandment was not universally 
mourned among ordinary Fijians who could now 
begin to dream of their own place in the sun. The 
chiefly abuse of power and privilege over the dec-
ades had taken its toll on their peoples’ loyalty.
Paramount chiefs ruled the Fijian roost 
throughout the 20th century. Until his death in 
1958, Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna was the unchallenged 
voice of his people in the councils of state, most 
notably as Secretary for Fijian Affairs in post-
war Fiji (Scarr 1980). In the second half, the most 
prominent high chiefs were Ratu George Cakobau, 
the Vunivalu of Bau, Ratu Edward Cakobau, Ratu 
Penaia Ganilau, and Ratu Kamisese Mara. They, and 
especially Mara, were groomed for national politi-
cal leadership by the departing British (Scarr 2008). 
Their large, looming presence on the national stage 
promoted the impression of Fijian political unity 
against the ever-present ‘threat’ of Indian domina-
tion. They were also like the banyan tree under 
which nothing grew. But the coup of 1987, carried 
out ostensibly to promote the unity and chiefly 
leadership of the Fijian people, and silently blessed 
by the leading chiefs, unwittingly unravelled the 
carefully crafted structures of traditional Fijian 
leadership. The illusion of their invincibility and 
indispensability to the nation’s future, carefully nur-
tured until then, was gone. Sitiveni Rabuka’s ascend-
ancy in the 1990s brought him in direct conflict 
with Ratu Mara, who had his own dynastic ambi-
tions as well as his well-known view that the busi-
ness of government was rightfully the prerogative of 
the chiefs. The clash between the two men reflected 
a larger subterranean tension in indigenous Fijian 
society — a larger clash of class interests. In any 
event, by 2006 all the paramounts were gone. Their 
progenies lacked lustre and national presence, there 
were no clear successors in sight, and many chiefs 
were variously embroiled in personal controversies 
over matrimonial and financial matters. There was 
thus a clear vacuum when Commodore Bainimara-
ma arrived on the scene. As well as having the back-
ing of the military, he had few competitors. In time, 
many chiefs who had initially opposed the coup 
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apologised to Bainimarama and sought forgiveness 
for their impudence, no doubt in the expectation of 
some reward from the regime — a building grant 
here, a development project there, a scholarship, 
an appointment to a statutory organisation.  Why 
else would chiefs need to ask for forgiveness from 
a man who had so unceremoniously undermined 
their status and power? The transformation, if that 
is what it was, was astonishing. The same people 
who just a decade ago were ardent supporters of 
iTaukei political paramountcy were now ardent 
champions of non-racial democracy.
The world of Fiji in 2006 clearly was vastly 
different to the Fiji that existed in the 1970s 
or even the 1980s. Travel and technology had 
revolutionised peoples’ perceptions of themselves 
and the world in which they lived. Workplaces 
and playing fields had become more multiracial. 
Television was a prominent presence in most 
homes and so, too, by the first decade of the 
21st century was the Internet (email, Facebook, 
blogsites). Old ways had lost their meaning and 
relevance. The citizens of Fiji were also citizens 
of the virtual world of ‘Googlisthan’ and open 
to new ideas. The real irony was that high chiefs 
themselves, such as Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, the 
military-appointed President of Fiji, joined in 
the chorus of denunciation of chiefly privileges 
and prerogatives of which they themselves were 
the primary beneficiaries. Whether this was rank 
opportunism (they had few employable skills) or 
genuine conversion, it is difficult to say.
Commodore Bainimarama
Enter Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Born 
on 27 April 1954, he had joined the Fijian navy 
in 1975, rising through the ranks to become the 
chief of staff of the Republic of Military Forces in 
November 1997, and its commander two years 
later when Brigadier General Ratu Epeli Ganilau, 
whose protégé he was, resigned to enter national 
politics, unsuccessfully as it turned out. Most 
observers have expressed surprise at the rapid 
rise and promotion of this unprepossessing naval 
officer from an unspectacular background. He was 
thought to be close to the Ganilau–Mara nexus 
of traditional Fijian politics. How mistaken that 
perception was became clear later; instead of being 
their guardian, he became their nemesis. As subse-
quent events would show, and keeping in tune with 
his characteristic mode of operation, he used the 
connection to ensconce himself in power, but then 
jettisoned it when it had outlived its usefulness. The 
old adage applies to him aptly: he has no permanent 
friends, just permanent interests. Now, subverting 
the old cultural order, the chiefs were doing his bid-
ding, not the other way around. What Bainimarama 
lacks in formal education and native intelligence, he 
more than makes up for in his finely honed skills of 
survival. There is no nuance or subtlety in his stark-
ly etched view of the world. Dialogue and debate 
are alien to his nature (Green 2013). He demon-
strated again and again that it would be his way and 
no other way. 
The first time Commodore Bainimarama 
came to prominence was in May 2000 during the 
George Speight–led insurrection when Mahendra 
Chaudhry’s Labour government was held hostage 
in the Fijian parliamentary complex for 56 days. 
The military appeared at the time to be hobbled by 
internal divisions and provincial loyalties, completely 
at sea about how to contain the hostage crisis. To 
end the siege, Bainimarama signed an agreement 
(Muanikau Accord) with the Speight rebels to release 
all hostages, including Chaudhry, and surrender 
under immunity. He later repudiated the deal, 
though not for the last time, and Speight landed 
in jail. That was his modus operandi. During the 
same crisis, Bainimarama led a delegation of senior 
military officers, including Major -General Ratu 
Epeli Ganilau and Brigadier General Sitiveni Rabuka, 
to ask president Mara to vacate his office in the 
interests of resolving the hostage crisis. That itself 
became a controversial initiative and the subject 
of further police investigation. Had Bainimarama 
committed a coup against the president? Mara’s 
enforced and bitterly resented departure ended the 
century old reign of the Tovata confederacy. It is not 
likely to return any time soon, if ever.
The other crucial event took place in November 
2000 and scarred Commodore Bainimarama’s life 
profoundly, according to those familiar with him. 
This was the mutiny in the Fiji military in which 
several loyalist soldiers were killed, with Bainimara-
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ma himself barely managing to escape assassination 
(Baledrokadroka 2013). It was a scenario no one 
had previously imagined of Fijian soldiers spilling 
Fijian blood on Fijian soil. Bainimarama wanted 
the rebel soldiers caught and brought to justice 
— justice Fijian military-style: blood curdling vio-
lence and torture, horrific deaths in custody, bodies 
bashed beyond recognition. The manner in which 
the mutiny was quashed caused public distress 
(and horror), but the commodore was determined 
to stamp his authority on the military by whatever 
means he could. To that end, he demanded a per-
sonal oath of loyalty to himself as the commander, 
not to the institution of the military. Those who 
could not oblige were sent packing, including sev-
eral senior officers. There was no further dissent. 
The military became Bainimarama’s unchallenged 
power base, ready and willing to do his bidding, 
whatever that might be. And he rewarded that loy-
alty generously. ‘I will always stand by my men’, he 
said repeatedly, to the delight of those under his 
charge, but to the dismay of those who wanted per-
petrators of violence to be brought to justice.
It was over the Qarase government’s handling 
of the military that permanently alienated the com-
modore from the government and strengthened his 
resolve to remove it from office. A new government 
elected in 2000 and headed by Laisenia Qarase, ini-
tially with Bainimarama’s endorsement, won office 
with the support of the Christian Alliance Matanitu 
ni Vanua — a party supporting George Speight and 
seeking his release from gaol and amnesty for other 
coup-conspirators. To that end, the Qarase govern-
ment promised a ‘Promotion of Reconciliation, Tol-
erance and Unity Bill’ to grant compensation to the 
victims of the 2000 coup and amnesty to its perpe-
trators. It was promoted as an effort to foster genu-
ine healing and unity, but it was on all accounts an 
ill-advised move whose full significance and impli-
cations were not appreciated at the time. Bainima-
rama was incensed and threatened to take action 
against the destabilisers. ‘The military,’ he said, ‘will 
dish out the same fate we dealt George Speight and 
his group to anyone we think deserves this treat-
ment.’ He went further and threatened to sack the 
government. ‘The RFMF must stop the Bill from 
passing or get rid of the Government if passed. We 
can recover without the Government; we cannot 
recover from the Bill’ (RFMF Media Release).
There were other pieces of legislation such 
as the Qoliqoli Bill to transfer the ownership of 
the foreshores from the Crown to its indigenous 
owners, which angered a large cross section of 
the population, from small individual fishermen 
to the barons of Fiji’s powerful tourism industry. 
They orchestrated and financed opposition to 
it by supporting political groups, including the 
National Alliance Party of Fiji headed by Ratu Epeli 
Ganilau. Why was the Qarase government in such 
a hurry to pass controversial legislation so early in 
its term and in the teeth of such fierce opposition, 
people asked. And why were political parties 
in government by virtue of the power sharing 
provisions of the 1997 constitution not consulted, 
especially the Fiji Labour Party? The main 
motivation, it seems, was to placate the nationalist 
elements in the governing coalition. In the end, 
bowing to public pressure, the government agreed 
not to push ahead, but by then it was too late; the 
damage had been done. For many, Bainimarama’s 
rhetoric became distinctly appealing. He emerged 
from the confrontation with his stature enhanced, 
as a figure on the side of the wider public standing 
against a corrupt government concerned only with 
its own survival.
For its part, the government tried to rein in an 
increasingly bellicose and belligerent Bainimarama. 
It sought in late 2006 to sack him, but the govern-
ment’s choice, Colonel Saubulinayau — a respected 
soldier, head of the Strategic Unit in Suva and for-
mer acting Land Forces commander — succumbed 
to the military’s pressure to decline commission 
from the president. Bainimarama brushed aside a 
government-commissioned white paper that rec-
ommended the trimming the top-heavy end of the 
military. The government’s decision not to renew 
Commodore Bainimarama’s contract was similarly 
disregarded. Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes’ 
investigation of Bainimarama’s role in the crisis of 
2000 was the last straw that broke the camel’s back. 
By then, Bainimarama was far gone in his determi-
nation to sack the government. He wanted to  
strike before he was struck down. That he did on  
5 December 2006.
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The official narrative of the 2006 coup pre-
sents Commodore Bainimarama as a noble patriot 
motivated by nothing less than a passionate desire 
to clean the country of corruption and steady the 
course towards a united, prosperous, non-racial 
future, breaking decisively with the country’s hob-
bled past and failed policies of nation-building. He 
would return to the barracks once his mission was 
complete, he said; he had no interest in politics; 
a political career had never entered his mind, he 
declared, as all illegal usurpers of power do. No-
one in his interim administration would be stand-
ing for election so that decisions would not be 
tainted by allegations of political self-interest. Any-
one wanting to serve alongside him would have 
to apply and would be selected on merit. His poli-
cies and programs would be open and transparent, 
above board. To a population subjected to a decade 
or more of corruption, abuse of office, the plunder-
ing of the public purse for petty political advantage, 
Bainimarama’s words were music to the ear.
But soon the hopes vanished as old practices 
and patterns of behaviour returned. Government 
tenders were offered without a competitive process 
of assessment. Corruption was easy to allege but far 
more difficult to substantiate and successfully pros-
ecute, as the regime-established Fiji Independent 
Commission Against Corruption found out. The 
same abuse of the judicial process occurred in get-
ting favoured (or family-related) prisoners released 
early from jail. Allegations of a massive interfer-
ence with the judiciary refused to disappear despite 
the strenuous efforts of regime supporters. Since 
2007, the auditor-general’s report has not released. 
The police forces were placed under Bainimarama’s 
deputy, Commodore Esala Teleni, who promptly 
sought to evangelise it with his fundamental-
ist Christian beliefs through the New Methodist 
Church headed by his brother Atu Vulaono (New-
land 2012), and proclaiming town after town to be 
‘crime-free’ in the face of massive evidence to the 
contrary and too much public derision. Loyal sen-
ior military officers were placed in charge of stra-
tegic government departments to the bitter disap-
pointment of career civil servants and contrary to 
Bainimarama’s promise not to allow anyone to ‘per-
sonally benefit’ from his regime. In 2013, most of 
them received astonishingly large salary increases — 
the largest in Fijian history. The politics of patron-
age was alive and well.
Beyond the rhetoric of ‘clean up campaign’, 
Commodore Bainimarama initially had no clear, 
overarching narrative for his military intervention. 
As it became clear later, the coup was more about 
saving Bainimarama’s bacon than it was about saving 
the nation. As the regime was floundering around 
looking for a justification, there entered a group 
of former Fiji technocrats with a plan to provide 
Bainimarama an ‘exit strategy’. The group was led 
by John Samy, a former Fiji economist and recently 
retired from the Asian Development Bank and 
as bona fide a technocrat as any, with a resolve to 
correct the mistakes of the past. His career in the Fiji 
civil service had unceremoniously ended in 1987, 
to his enduring bitterness. He now wanted to return 
to Fiji to give ‘something’ back, at a modest fee of 
FJ$12, 000 tax free per month. He helped establish 
a ‘National Council for Building a Better Fiji’ in 
2007 to make recommendations to create a just and 
fair society, promote unity and national identity, 
have transparent and accountable government, 
ameliorate the condition of the disadvantaged in all 
communities, mainstream indigenous Fijians in a 
progressive society, and share interfaith dialogue. 
These values were generally included in the 1997 
constitution but had to be reiterated anew to provide 
an appearance of newness to the military regime.
In August 2008, the council published its 
‘People’s Charter for Change, Peace and Prosperity’. 
The charter was based on a number of ‘Pillar 
Principles’ that included, among others: the 
abolition of racial voting characteristic of Fiji 
for much of the 20th century; the adoption of 
the proportional representation voting system; 
entrenching principles of good, accountable, 
transparent governance; and effective delivery of 
public service —all unexceptionable aspirational 
goals. The charter proposed that its principles be 
incorporated into the 1997 constitution which, it 
said, would continue to remain the supreme law of 
the land. That work completed, the constitutional 
impasse would come to an end, the army would 
return to the barracks and the country would be 
prepared for the next general elections. The charter 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm8                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Brij V. Lal
would become Commodore Bainimarama’s exit 
strategy. Nothing of the sort happened.
The charter consultation process, with all its 
obvious flaws and faults, had bought Bainimarama 
valuable time to consolidate his position. It had 
given his military adventure an aura of purpose-
fulness and the charter a tentative nod of approval 
from the international community. The Common-
wealth Secretariat lauded his proposal to start a 
political dialogue with key stakeholders, including 
the various political parties. It sent its envoy, Sir 
Paul Reeves, the former chair of the Fiji Constitu-
tion Review Commission, to facilitate the process, 
but he was ignored by the regime, and the dialogue 
process unceremoniously dumped in characteris-
tic Bainimarama fashion. He adopted the charter 
principles as the foundation of his ‘Roadmap Back 
to Democracy’ to ‘mend the ever widening racial 
divide that currently besets our multiracial nation’, 
but then proceeded in April 2009 to abrogate the 
1997 constitution. The principles of accountabil-
ity and transparency were disregarded as Baini-
marama proceeded to run the country by decree, 
many of them unchallengeable in a court of law. 
The decrees infringed basic human rights, such as 
the right to free speech, and the right of association 
and assembly, and trade union rights were emascu-
lated. International fact-finding missions, from the 
International Bar Association and the International 
Labour Organisation, were denied entry. Drunk on 
decrees, the regime pushed ahead with no account-
ing to the public for its policies or deeds or for the 
disbursement from the public purse. The arrogance 
of unearned power was again on full display.
Sources of Support
How did all this come to pass? How did the Com-
modore manage to consolidate his grip on the 
country with such apparent ease? Among other 
things, was the strategic deployment of the tactics 
of fear and violence. Opponents and alleged oppo-
nents of the coup were targeted by the military, 
taken to the Queen Elizabeth barracks and subject-
ed to psychological torture, beatings and general 
harassment. There were threatening phone calls at 
night, stoning of vehicles and homes of regime crit-
ics, attempted arson. Fiji had experienced wanton 
acts of violence before, especially after the Septem-
ber 1987 coup, but nothing quite like this: system-
atic, relentless and brutal. There was no investiga-
tion and no charges laid, which was not surprising 
as the police commissioner himself was a senior 
military officer. Violence, or the threat of violence 
became an inescapable reality of post-2006 Fiji. 
Land Forces Commander, Pita Driti, now languish-
ing in jail for purported plotting against his former 
boss, told dissenters in 2010 that they ‘will be in for 
something really hard in terms of how we will treat 
them this year’ (Fraenkel 2011, 456). Commodore 
Bainimarama himself threatened, ‘We’ll need to 
shut people up’, so as not to endanger reforms he 
had set in train (Fraenkel 2011, 457). Fear is a pow-
erfully disabling emotion, but, as Cicero says, it is 
not a lasting teacher of duty.
Another tactic was the complete clampdown 
of the local media, especially after the abrogation 
of the 1997 constitution in April 2009. Military 
censors were placed in television and newspaper 
editorial rooms, vetting items for broadcast or 
publication. Editors who stood up to the regime’s 
intimidation, such as Russell Hunter of the Fiji 
Sun, were deported. The home of Netani Rika, the 
uncompromising editor of the Fiji Times, was tar-
geted by a fire bomb. News-wise, Fiji was an area of 
complete darkness. Even when formal restrictions 
were lifted, reporters prudently exercised deliber-
ate self-censorship for fear of retribution from the 
regime. The upshot was that people read or heard 
only what the regime allowed to be published or 
broadcast. On the internet, anti-regime blogsites 
mushroomed, spreading information and deliberate 
disinformation, but only a small percentage of the 
Fiji population had access to them. The country ran 
on rumour and gossip with the regime’s spies eve-
rywhere. Understandably, overt dissent disappeared 
or went underground.
Compounding the problem was the public’s 
diminished confidence in law enforcement and 
judicial institutions. The police force was under 
the command of a military officer (Commodore 
Esala Teleni succeeded by Brigadier General Ioane 
Naivalarua). Convicted police officers received early 
release from prison, and reports of police brutality 
captured on video screened around the world, went 
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uninvestigated. Commodore Bainimarama’s defiant 
declaration to ‘stand by his men’ dampened enthu-
siasm for diligent investigation. There was simi-
larly diminished confidence in the impartiality and 
independence of the judiciary. The regime denied 
interference, but revelations by departing judges 
were sufficiently credible to be dismissed easily. As 
Justice Randal Powell said in August 2011, ‘the Fiji 
military regime’s idea of an independent judiciary 
is one that does the government’s bidding’, adding 
that the judges appointed ‘would know that if they 
start pursuing an independent line, there can be 
consequences’ (Fraenkel 2012, 384). Justice Mar-
shall similarly complained of ‘progressive inroads 
into the independence of the judiciary’. In the 
civil service, the presence of senior military offic-
ers as permanent heads of department, with direct 
access to Commodore Bainimarama and in effect 
accountable to him personally and no-one else, had 
its own consequences.
We turn now to the response of the different 
communities to the coup and subsequent develop-
ments. Let me begin with the Indo-Fijians. Con-
trary to popular perception, the community was 
not united in its response to the coup. There were 
many who were opposed to the military takeo-
ver. These included political parties (the National 
Federation Party, non-governmental organisa-
tions, and cultural organisations — Sangam, for 
example) as well as prominent individuals (Wadan 
Narsey, Shameema Ali, Imrana Jalal, to name just 
a few). On the other hand, significant sections of 
the community, if not actively supporting the coup, 
adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ approach, giving Commo-
dore Bainimarama the benefit of the doubt. Among 
them were the dispossessed, the disinherited and 
the desperate: victims of previous coups and of the 
racially discriminatory affirmative action policies 
that followed in their wake. They knew first-hand 
what corruption was, and they believed the mili-
tary’s ‘clean up campaign’ rhetoric. 
Less understandable was the response of the 
‘intellectual class’ which, with one or two notable 
exceptions, silently supported the coup. This group 
included vice chancellors of the three universities 
who differed from each other only in the enthu-
siasm with which they backed the regime and its 
purported aims. There was prudent appreciation 
of who controlled the purse strings, but retribu-
tion for past real and imagined against them also 
weighed in their thinking. The message their 
pliant behaviour sent was well understood by 
their subordinates. Inevitably a culture of silence 
ensued. Others talked about ethical and unethi-
cal coups straining at the edges to justify the 
unjustifiable. They were joined by many Indo-
Fijian expatriates —‘retired re-treads’, according 
to some anti-government bloggers — in their 
twilight of their careers who had left the country 
in personally unhappy circumstances but who 
now returned to lend a helping hand, for a hand-
some fee, of course. Some are belatedly beginning 
to rue their poor judgment but the damage has 
already been done.
Moral leaders of the Indo-Fijian commu-
nity were among the early cheerleaders of the 
coup. Among them was Dewan Maharaj — the 
president of Fiji’s largest Hindu organisation, the 
Sanatan Dharam Pratinidhi Sabha, and the owner 
of one of the country’s largest printing compa-
nies working closely with the regime. The Arya 
Samaj — the much smaller but very well con-
nected Hindu reformist organisation — was not 
far behind. The Fiji Muslim League was in the 
regime’s corner but kept its presence quiet. Some 
have claimed that the 2006 coup was in fact a 
Muslim coup, given the presence of so many of 
that faith in the regime or easily counted among 
its supporters. Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum is the vain, 
voluble and highly visible attorney-general — the 
second most powerful person in government 
after Commodore Bainimarama himself. Others 
who are often mentioned as regime supporters 
and sympathisers include the former High Court 
judge Nazhat Shameem; former chair of the Fiji 
Human Rights Commission, Shaista Shameem; 
and many others of lower rank and visibility. 
Understandably, they  have all strenuously denied 
complicity, and are therefore entitled to the ben-
efit of the doubt. The claim about large Muslim 
support is far-fetched. There are many Muslims 
who do not support the coup. There was no Mus-
lim conspiracy; it is just that some prominent 
individuals who opportunistically backed the 
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regime happened to be of the Muslim faith. That 
said, it is true that the leadership of the Fiji Muslim 
League has always had a cosy relationship with the 
power elite of Fiji, including for many decades with 
the Alliance Party of Ratu Mara, in the hope of get-
ting separate Muslim representation in parliament. 
The most enigmatic question in Fiji is Sayed 
Khaiyum’s relationship with Commodore Baini-
marama. It is no secret that Khaiyum is deeply dis-
trusted by the military and disliked by a wide spec-
trum of iTaukei society for his brazen manners and 
ideological zeal.  As Brigadier General Pita Driti’s 
treason trial in late 2013 revealed, there was some 
loose talk  among a small section of the military 
about  eliminating him altogether. Many Fijians see 
him as the evil genius behind the throne manipu-
lating Bainimarama, the prime mover of policies 
that have destroyed or seriously impaired iTaukei 
institutions under the current regime. What hold 
does this man then have over the prime minister? 
It is far too simplistic to see him as the wily manip-
ulator of an otherwise innocent, well-meaning 
Bainimarama. Khaiyum’s loyalty to the commo-
dore is complete and unbreakable. He is politically 
ambitious but does not have an independent power 
base of his own. He was a nondescript lawyer 
before 2006. He has burned his bridges with virtu-
ally everyone for good. Bainimarama is all he has 
got. He was nothing before  Bainimarama, and he 
will be  nothing after him. Doors to him in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand are firmly shut. He is an 
anathema to international civil society organisa-
tions for the draconian decrees he has authorised. 
That is why he shows all the passion of the twice 
converted in his slavish attachment to the military 
leader. For his part, Commodore Bainimarama has 
an acute understanding of his attorney-general’s 
vulnerability and uses it to his full advantage. He 
knows that Khaiyum will never be a threat to him 
and that he will diligently do his, Bainimarama’s, 
bidding. He will always deliver, whatever the cost. 
And the Commodore has placed absolute, uncon-
ditional loyalty high on the list of virtues he most 
prizes. Convergence of mutual interest rather than 
conspiracy underpins the relationship between 
the prime minister and his attorney-general. Once 
Khaiyum outlives his usefulness, he too, like so 
many others before him, will be left to fend for 
himself. 
The most important Indo-Fijian leader who 
backed the coup and joined the Bainimarama cabi-
net in early 2007 as its finance minister was the Fiji 
Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry. Why 
would a leader of Chaudhry’s background — a 
victim of two previous coups — join the military 
regime? Chaudhry defended his decision on the 
high moral ground that his intervention was moti-
vated by nothing other than a desire to save his 
country from complete financial collapse after the 
coup. That might have been so, but he was also a 
man deeply embittered by the policies of the Qarase 
government, unforgiving in his anger at being dis-
lodged from power at the hands of Fijian national-
ists in 2000. This was his chance to take his revenge 
on them. Revenge and retribution loomed large 
in his thinking. Chaudhry is an experienced trade 
unionist, and he probably thought that he could 
use his vast experience to manipulate the situation 
to his political advantage. As former New Zealand 
high commissioner to Fiji, Michael Green, puts it 
(2013, 168): ‘Chaudhry would not stand in the way 
of a coup, let alone use his considerable influence to 
prevent one’.
Chaudhry lasted a year and a half in the regime 
when he was forced out of his finance portfolio. 
Soon afterwards, he became an implacable foe of 
the regime but from the sideline, a much-dimin-
ished figure, his reputation for probity dimmed and 
his political base fragmented. His erstwhile col-
leagues have founded parties of their own (such as 
Peoples’ Democratic Party), citing irreconcilable 
differences with their former leader. Chaudhry’s 
joining the military regime had certain important 
consequences. In the first place, it bought Commo-
dore Bainimarama valuable time to consolidate his 
position. Chaudhry’s company portrayed him in a 
favourable light — not as a military dictator but as 
a leader determined to put Fiji on a different, more 
progressive path. Once Chaudhry had served his 
purpose, Bainimarama discarded him, as was his 
wont. Chaudhry’s support for the regime also put a 
large section of the Indo-Fijian community behind 
it. And it stifled local and overseas opposition to 
the coup regime. In 1987, overseas trade unions led 
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the international opposition to the coup, especially 
in Australia and New Zealand. In 2006, they were 
confused to see the main trade union leader inside 
the coup cabinet, urging restraint rather than sanc-
tions.
Seven years after the coup, the Indo-Fijian 
community is still divided. There are many gravy 
train riders who have done well out of the regime 
through lucrative contracts, tenders and the like. 
Many opportunistic businessmen support the 
regime though most have transferred their assets 
and moved their families offshore. They have noth-
ing to lose but their bank over drafts should  Fiji 
falter again. Others lent support in the hope of 
handouts. Many want respite from the constant 
turbulence that has characterised Fiji for the past 
two decades. On the whole, the early euphoric sup-
port for the regime has evaporated because of disil-
lusionment with its practices, although many Fiji-
ans continued to see an Indo-Fijian’s hand behind 
the regime.
On the Fijian side, initially there was confu-
sion and anger: anger because a Fijian-dominated 
government had been deposed by a Fijian military, 
and confusion about what to do next. The deposed 
prime minister Laisenia Qarase was self-exiled in 
his Mavana village in the remote Lau province for 
several crucial months, depriving his supporters 
of a rallying point, a symbolic figure of resistance. 
The GCC and Methodist Church (to which the 
majority of Fijians belong) were unceremoniously 
sidelined by Commodore Bainimarama. The GCC 
is now abolished, and Methodist Church has been 
prevented from holding its annual convention. The 
Provincial Councils are in limbo, their heads now 
appointed by the regime, not elected by the peo-
ple themselves. They were once the cornerstone of 
rural Fijian administration; now they are a pliant 
tool of the regime. Fijian society is a leader-driven 
society, and the absence from the public stage of 
traditional leaders was keenly felt. All the tradition-
al channels of communication and guidance were 
summarily disabled. Overall, Fijians have shown a 
pragmatic assessment of the situation in Fiji. They 
will shift to wherever the power lies. Their support 
for the regime is contingent, not absolute. Silence, 
in this instance, does not mean consent. To quote 
Robert Louis Stevenson, Cruelest lies are often told 
in silence.
By contrast, Bainimarama can count on the 
unswerving loyalty of his troops. The size of the 
military, and certainly its annual budget, increased 
substantially. Recruits came from all parts of the 
country. They were often high school dropouts, with 
few skills, unemployed. Commodore Bainimarama 
gave them an identity and a purpose, a mission, 
and they repaid him with unswerving loyalty. They 
knew deep down that should their commander 
fail, they will all face the charge of treason. For the 
moment, they are shielded by the immunity provi-
sions of the 2013 constitution. Bainimarama’s hold 
on the military was complete despite occasional 
murmurs of mutiny. Soldiers swore an oath of loy-
alty to him as the Commander of the Fiji Military 
Forces rather than to the institution of the military. 
Senior officers entered the civil service to carry out 
‘Bainimarama’s ‘mission’. In a very real sense, Baini-
marama became in his own right the paramount 
chief of a new vanua: the Fijian military. 
Beyond the military, Commodore Bainimarama 
presented himself as a new kind of Fijian, modern, 
multiracial and self-made, impatient with the 
protocol and hierarchy of traditional Fijian 
society. In his life and accomplishments many 
commoner Fijians saw possibilities for themselves 
for independence and self-realisation. For far too 
long, indeed for much of the 20th century, Fijian 
and national politics had been dominated by high 
chiefs and their families while they themselves 
had been taken for granted and consigned to the 
shadows. Commodore Bainimarama gave them 
hope and a chance to shine in their own right. 
Many welcomed positions and promotions in the 
civil service with the departure of the incumbents. 
For some, Bainimarama’s coup slowly morphed into 
a ‘Fijian coup’, fulfilling the long-held goals of the 
Fijian nationalists such as foreign minister Inoke 
Kubuabola. 
What of the reaction of ‘Others’, that is, 
non-Fijians and non-Indo-Fijians. A blanket 
generalisation is inappropriate because there are 
both supporters and dissidents amongst them, but 
it is beyond doubt that a significant section of them 
silently backed the coup and rallied to provide the 
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nascent military regime support by accepting senior 
administrative and diplomatic postings (Winston 
Thompson, Peter Thomson, among many others). 
The ever adaptable Jim Ah Koy, a prominent local 
businessman and for a while Fiji’s ambassador to 
China, jumped on the bandwagon and joined the 
chorus condemning ‘old politicians’ of whom he 
was one himself. For much of the 20th century, 
Europeans and Part-Europeans had provided the 
prop for the Fijian establishment, useful for their 
electoral and financial support but not much 
besides. It was the fear of ‘Indian domination’ that 
had put them in the Fijian corner, but that fear 
was now gone, and they were on their own. With 
the dismantling of that establishment, the ‘Others’ 
saw freedom at last from the shadows and shackles 
of the past. Their support for the regime too is 
contingent, not absolute; they will move to wherever 
power lies. To the ranks of the local supporters came 
some old European expatriates now in their twilight 
years and others with hopes of cashing in on the 
Fijian crisis, with their own blogsites chanting 
the mantra of multiracialism and proclaiming 
Commodore Bainimarama the new messiah for Fiji. 
There is no doubt that there are many who believe 
in the prospect of a genuine democracy under 
Bainimarama’s leadership, but private self interest is 
barely  concealed in many calculations.
Civil society and non-governmental organisa-
tions generally opposed the coup, but there were 
some, such as the Citizens Constitutional Forum, 
which initially adopted an ‘indeterminate’ posi-
tion, hoping that bad means might lead eventu-
ally to good ends (Green, 2013: 167). In the end, 
it fell afoul of the regime and in August 2013, its 
head, Rev. Akuila Yabaki, was charged for repub-
lishing an article locally that questioned the inde-
pendence of the Fiji judiciary. The Methodist 
Church was hobbled, but the Catholic Church, or 
at least some of its leading figures, expressed an 
understanding of and sympathy for Commodore 
Bainimarama’s policies. Archbishop Petero Mataca 
accepted appointment as co-chair of the National 
Council for Building a Better Fiji, and senior priest 
Father Kevin Barr became a prominent, indeed 
often combative, supporter of the coup through his 
newspaper columns. He believed in Bainimarama’s 
purported aims of the coup and placed ‘social jus-
tice’ ahead of ‘human rights’ in his agenda. The 
coup was not the ideal way to change government, 
Father Barr and others like him appeared to be say-
ing, but if it served as an instrument for progres-
sive social reform, it might not be such a bad thing 
after all. But even Father Barr, for all his vocal pub-
lic support for it, was not spared the regime’s wrath 
when he made some mildly mocking remarks 
about Fiji’s increasing closeness to China. Com-
modore Bainimarama texted him, calling him a 
‘Fucked up priest’, saying several times ‘Fuck U 
arsehole. Stay well away from me’. Barr relayed 
the abusive messages to his close friends, and they 
soon found their way in the cyberspace (Fiji Today 
16/1/13). For good measure, Bainimarama threat-
ened to revoke Barr’s missionary visa, leading the 
Catholic priest to apologise for his ‘bad’ judgement. 
The threat of deportation worked. Bainimarama’s 
intemperate outburst was not uncharacteristic or 
unexpected: it fitted into a pattern of behaviour 
that did not tolerate dissent or disagreement, which 
raises the question of how the commodore will 
function in a civilian administration  that operates 
on the basis of consensus and compromise.
By 2010, Commodore Bainimarama was con-
fidently ensconced in power. His enjoyment of it 
was palpable. He had worn down or otherwise har-
assed his opponents into sullen silence, at least for 
the time being. He had the civil service under the 
control of hand-picked military men and regime-
friendly bureaucrats. The military was fully behind 
him. Businessmen came calling, with offers of sup-
port and further investment. He made frequent 
foreign visits on various missions, leaving his eager 
attorney-general in charge. With the assistance of 
experienced foreign policy hands such as Peter 
Thomson — Fiji’s representative to the United 
Nations — the regime began to explore a newer 
place for Fiji in regional and international affairs.
The Wider World
The 2006 coup was widely condemned. It could 
not be otherwise. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 
invoked the Biketawa Declaration (2000) which 
enjoined respect for the rule of law and ‘upholding 
the democratic processes and institutions which 
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reflect national and local circumstances, including 
the peaceful transfer of power’ (PIF Secretariat). 
The European Union invoked the Cotonou Agree-
ment and the Commonwealth the Harare Decla-
ration, both of which recognise the individual’s 
‘inalienable right to participate by means of free 
and democratic political process in framing the 
society in which he or she lives’. Australia and New 
Zealand imposed travel bans on the regime’s clos-
est supporters and cancelled defence co-operation 
with the Fijian military. The attorney-general, to 
his enduring annoyance, was stripped of his Aus-
tralian permanent residency. All this was predict-
able, though the Fiji regime was probably shaken 
by the vehemence of the condemnation. Its narra-
tive of a ‘good coup’ and ‘clean up campaign’ was 
clearly not finding traction with its neighbours or 
the international community. 
At first stumbling, Fiji soon began to strike 
back. It adopted a ‘Look North’ policy. China 
responded enthusiastically. An emerging global 
giant, it was already looking for fresh fields for 
new resources (timber, minerals, marine). Fiji’s 
overture came at an opportune time, and China 
provided soft loans and development assistance 
(building roads, bridges, dams). For its part, Fiji 
played the ‘China Card’ to the maximum, hoping 
to force Australia and New Zealand into a more 
accommodating stance towards the regime. That 
hope remained unfulfilled, but not before ignit-
ing a debate in Australia at least about whether 
engaging with the rogue regime might not be in its 
national interest despite serious imperfections in 
the regime’s proposed constitution and the over-
arching role for the military in the political life of 
the country (Herr and Bergin, 2013). The Labour 
government remained unconvinced, demand-
ing a more demonstrable commitment to restor-
ing the country to full parliamentary democracy 
before relaxation could be contemplated, but the 
new (2013) Coalition government has expressed a 
willingness to engage with Fiji. Sooner rather than 
later, it will discover the dangers of dealing with a 
mercurial regime determined to have its own way 
and no other way. 
Within the region, Fiji worked assiduously 
to fragment opposition to it. These included 
taking a more prominent role in the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG), of which it had largely 
been a dormant and late-joining member in the 
past. Vanuatu outdid the others by conferring 
upon Bainimarama a high chiefly title  — Chief 
Warwar; this upon a man who had undermined 
the chiefly system in Fiji. Fiji tried to orchestrate 
anti-Australia sentiment among MSG members 
and in the region more widely, portraying it as a big 
white neo-colonial power insensitive to the needs of 
small Pacific island states. There is, for a variety of 
reasons, a reservoir of resentment against Australia 
in the region and Fiji tried to tap into it. But in the 
end, Fiji’s courting of the MSG is opportunistic 
and cynical. In private, some Melanesian leaders 
concede as much, but they are also acutely aware of 
Fiji’s regional influence, including as the home of 
vital regional institutions such as the University of 
the South Pacific and as the hub of regional air and 
sea transport connections. 
Fiji mercilessly pilloried the PIF for its unwill-
ingness to endorse the legitimacy of the coup by its 
secretary general, Samoan judge Tuiloma Neroni 
Slade. The ridiculing and belittling comments about 
Bainimarama by the Samoan Prime Minister Tui-
laepa Malielegaoi, incensed the Fiji regime even 
further, although it was refreshing to see a Pacific 
leader show his courage of conviction. To bypass the 
PIF, Fiji began to explore the possibility of setting 
up a rival organisation. It convened separate meet-
ings with selected island leaders (to which Australia 
and New Zealand were pointedly not invited) on the 
eve of PIF annual meetings that attempted to show-
case Fiji’s leadership of the region. In August 2013, 
Fiji spearheaded the move to establish a new Pacific 
Islands Development Forum as an alternative space 
to raise development issues in small Pacific Island 
states. This it did with the support of some local 
NGOs, such as the International Union for the Con-
servation of Nature, which sought more influence 
and recognition in the region. Predictably, Samoa 
rejected the idea as a political ploy by Fiji to regain 
its former leadership role. Whether it will amount 
to much more than a regional talkfest in the absence 
of financial backing from Australia and New Zea-
land — the region’s traditional donor countries — 
remains to be seen. Fiji, for its part, hopes that its 
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new-found friends in in the developing world will 
stand by it in its future confrontations with its tra-
ditional neighbours and partners. 
Beyond the region, Fiji opened embassies in 
South Africa, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates, 
and, as a new member of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment, signed memoranda of understanding with 
Iran and North Korea. Russia became a new-found 
friend, and Fiji contributed a large peacekeeping 
force in the Golan Heights. It chaired the summit 
of G77. Fiji campaigned strongly, but in the end 
unsuccessfully, against Australia’s drive for a seat 
on the Security Council, hoping for an eventual 
place there for itself as the representative of the 
Oceania region. How these manoeuvres will unfold 
in the future remains unclear, but the Fiji regime’s 
determination to break away from the traditional 
pattern of diplomatic relations is beyond dispute. 
Fiji now considers itself far too important to be 
restrained by the protocols of regional politics in 
the South Pacific. As Bainimarama has said, ‘We 
have gone beyond the region to chair the G77, the 
biggest voting bloc in the United Nations. We are 
leading the Pacific small islands developing states 
at the United Nations. We are leading players in the 
MSG. We have joined the Non-Aligned Movement. 
So it is no big deal for us to return to the Forum’ 
(fijilive 16/9/13). Fiji’s illusion of grandeur and 
glory on the global stage are starkly etched.
There has been much adverse comment in Fiji 
about Australia and New Zealand. From within 
Fiji and from sections of the Australian commen-
tariat, including the Australia–Fiji Business Coun-
cil, have come calls for Australia to re-engage with 
Fiji. The most cogent response to this question has 
come from the late Michael Green, in his book Per-
sona Non Grata. Green was New Zealand’s High 
Commissioner to Fiji from 2004–07 when he was 
expelled from Fiji. ‘The pro-engagement proposi-
tion,’ Green argues, is ‘grounded in delusion about 
Bainimarama. He is not interested in advice or 
assistance unless it is to sustain him in power to 
implement his agenda in entirety. He is uncomfort-
able with the clash of ideas, negotiation and com-
promise, all critical elements to effectively func-
tioning democracies. He is not interested in expert 
opinion if it does not conform to his understand-
ing of the way things should be’ (Green 2013, 270). 
Father Kevin Barr and other early supporters of the 
Commodore’s would attest to that.
Green goes on to point out the gap between 
Commodore Bainimarama’s words and deeds. The 
Commodore presents himself as a champion of 
good governance, but his actions belie that claim. 
As already mentioned, the military budget bal-
looned under his watch. He defied the elected gov-
ernment’s white paper recommendations to trim 
the top-heavy military to a more sustainable size. 
Compulsory Supervision Order was used (as it had 
been by Qarase as well) to effect early release of 
prisoners, including his brother-in-law who was 
jailed for manslaughter. He went to prison on full 
pay and was appointed a permanent secretary upon 
release. Abuse of human rights of escaped prison-
ers by police and the military went unpunished, 
including the barbaric beating of escaped prisoners 
captured in a video that horrified the world. Baini-
marama accused Qarase of practising cronyism, but 
he himself was not above appointing loyalist sol-
diers to cabinet, to senior positions in the civil ser-
vice and to statutory organisations. ‘The fact is that 
Bainimarama does not trust civilians, with a few 
exceptions, and prefers to appoint people to whom 
he can give orders with confidence that they will 
be carried out’ (Green 2013, 271). Evidence from 
around the world suggests that ‘military services 
routinely make bad governments, because they 
have a culture of command-and-obey and thereby 
cannot cope with dissent, disobedience, defiance or 
a “clash of ideas” in any way, shape or form’.
One of the strong justifications Commodore 
Bainimarama had for his coup against the Qarase 
government was that it was giving succour to the 
coup plotters of 2000 through the Promotion of 
Reconciliation, Truth and Unity Bill — a claim that 
many in Fiji believed. But he was himself not above 
giving favours to key coup strategists. Berenado 
Vunibobo, George Speight’s foreign policy advisor, 
was appointed Fiji’s representative to the United 
Nations. Colonel Pita Driti was nominated for the 
post of high commissioner to Malaysia, which was 
declined by Malaysia. The biggest travesty of all 
was the appointment of Inoke Kubuabola first as 
high commissioner to Papua New Guinea and later 
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as Fiji’s foreign minister. He was a founding mem-
ber of the nationalist Taukei Movement in 1987, a 
key, self-confessed architect of the 1987 coup (Lal 
1988), an advisor to George Speight, and a staunch 
defender of the racist, widely discredited 1990 
constitution. Another Taukei Movement member 
and 1987 coup supporter who found a place in 
Bainimarama’s cabinet was the octogenarian Filipe 
Bole. Understandably, Bainimarama’s commitment 
to promoting open and transparent governance 
sounded unconvincing enough to foreign govern-
ments not to give their stamp of approval to the 
Bainimarama narrative. 
Future
Now to the future. The regime has promised 
to hold general elections by September 2014. 
There are many who doubt this commitment 
in view of the regime’s public record of broken 
promises. Reneging on solemn commitments 
without explanation or apology is the Fiji regime’s 
way of conducting its affairs. But given the 
repeated assurances the regime has given to the 
international community, it is difficult to see how 
it can defer the elections. Let us therefore assume 
that elections will be held in 2014. The question 
then becomes what kind of elections. Will they be 
free and fair? Will all political parties be allowed 
to play on a level playing field? Will the regime’s 
party, yet to be formed, accept the verdict of the 
ballot box and soldiers voluntarily retreat to the 
barracks if their party loses the elections? Or will 
the military simply discard the verdict, claim 
that its original mission (whatever it was) is not 
yet complete, that people elected to parliament 
would jeopardise all the ‘gains’ made thus far and 
continue in power, claiming enthusiastic ground 
swell of support? It is not an improbable scenario. 
For his part, Commodore Bainimarama has, on 
several occasions, declared that he will win the 
elections whatever the impediments in his way. His 
complete confidence in his own political prospects 
is interesting, to say the least. 
One promise the regime has fulfilled is giv-
ing Fiji a new constitution, though not the one 
most Fijians had wanted. After the abrogation of 
the 1997 constitution in April 2009, a new consti-
tution was always in prospect, although with little 
sense of urgency as the country was being run by a 
plethora of decrees flowing almost daily from the 
attorney-general’s chambers. In August 2012, the 
regime finally appointed a Constitution Commission, 
headed by the distinguished Kenyan constitutional 
lawyer Professor Yash Ghai, to draft a new constitu-
tion for Fiji. Ghai’s choice was intriguing. Perhaps the 
regime, certainly the attorney-general, thought he 
might be more sympathetic to the regime’s hopes and 
aspirations. Khaiyum was his law student in Hong 
Kong, and Ghai had surprisingly refrained from 
expressing an opinion on Bainimarama’s coup. In the 
end, doubts about Ghai proved baseless. He proved 
himself to be the peerless constitutional engineer of 
integrity he always had been, though let down by one 
of his fellow commissioners who is widely believed to 
have been the military’s mole on the commission. 
After an extensive process of consultation (over 
7000 submissions were received), Ghai produced 
a draft constitution that was comprehensive, 
progressive, participatory and inclusive. A new non-
racial electoral system with closed-list proportional 
representation at its heart was proposed, voting 
age lowered to 18, a certain percentage of seats in 
parliament was to be reserved for women, the civil 
society was encouraged to participate in the political 
process (a part of a national assembly which 
would help elect the president). The multi-party 
power-sharing concept of the 1997 constitution 
was rejected. The Senate, as a house of review, was 
gone, as was the constituency system central to 
the Westminster system. The GCC was stripped 
of its former constitutional role in appointing the 
president and exercising an oversight role over 
Fijian affairs, and accorded the status of a civil 
society organisation. Immunity would be granted 
to those who had participated in the coup, but 
only after they publicly acknowledged their role in 
it. Closure would only come after full disclosure. 
And while the military was placed firmly under 
civilian control, serving men and women were free 
to disobey illegal orders. The military’s preference 
for a guardian role for itself, with the responsibility 
to ‘ensure at all times the security, defence and 
wellbeing of Fiji and its people’ was firmly rejected 
(RFMF 2012).
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The Ghai draft proposed measured move-
ment in a new direction. It was presented to the 
president on 21 December2012 The draft was to 
have gone to the president and then presented to a 
hand-picked Constituent Assembly for final ratifi-
cation. But the draft proved to be a stillborn. The 
military was miffed and Bainimarama disgruntled 
with, among other things, the recommendations 
regarding immunity and the limited public role for 
the military. The president rejected it on 10 January 
2013, dismissing it as a backward looking docu-
ment which, if adopted, would lead to ‘financial 
and economic catastrophe and ruin’ (Office of the 
President Press Release). The draft’s proposal to 
have a peoples’ assembly elect the president would 
be an ‘anathema to democratic representation’. It 
was not the president’s prerogative to pass a judg-
ment on the Ghai draft, but he was, after all, a crea-
ture of the military — its pliant tool with a record 
of doing its bidding and living the good life on the 
public purse. The much-touted constituent assem-
bly was also summarily discarded. In a symbolic act 
of humiliation, a special contingent of police offic-
ers burned the printers’ copies of the draft in Ghai’s 
anguished presence. Once again, Bainimarama had 
the last laugh. He had managed to convince, or con, 
the international community into believing that the 
Ghai exercise was genuine, and managed to secure 
overseas funds for it as well, but when the commis-
sion refused to rubberstamp the military regime’s 
agenda, it was unceremoniously disbanded. Sadly, 
one of its members continued to sing the praises of 
the military regime.
A new constitution, prepared by lawyers in the 
attorney-general’s chambers with no public con-
sultation, was promulgated on 6 September 2013 
by the president. It differed only in minor details 
from the draft constitution the regime released on 
21March. There are many positive, forward look-
ing features in it. The new constitution has retained 
the regime’s non-negotiable ‘universal principles’ of 
a common and equal citizenry, a common name of 
‘Fijian’ for all citizens, a secular state, an independ-
ent judiciary, good and transparent governance, 
entrenchment of economic and cultural rights, 
non-racial voting, the open list proportional rep-
resentation system and a lower voting age (18). All 
this is commendable, but the constitution contains 
provisions that make a mockery of the Westminster 
system of government. The powers of the prime 
minister and the attorney-general are consider-
ably enhanced. The consultative provisions govern-
ing role of the leader of the opposition are gone. 
The prime ninister chairs the ‘independent’ Con-
stitutional Offices Commission. The chief justice 
is appointed by the president on the advice of the 
prime minister and the attorney-general (rather 
than the leader of the opposition). The military is 
entrusted with maintaining the ‘wellbeing’ of the cit-
izens of Fiji without overarching civilian oversight. 
The parliament is reduced to laying pliant role 
in the governance of the country. The provisions of 
the various draconian decrees curtailing the free-
dom of speech, assembly and association remain. 
The Bill of Rights is impressive in its comprehen-
siveness, but so are the derogations from it. And 
the constitution devised by ‘we the people’ cannot 
be changed without 75 per cent of votes in parlia-
ment and an equal percentage in a national refer-
endum. In other words, it is virtually impossible to 
change, except through another coup. In the words 
of the former vice-president Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, 
other ‘disturbing provisions’ include ‘disrupting the 
balance of power between different arms of state 
(s. 133), limiting political rights (s. 6), shielding 
decrees from legal challenge (s. 173), and expand-
ing the role of the army (s. 130). ‘ He argues that 
not ‘only do these run contrary to the government’s 
own non-negotiable principles that set the bar for a 
quality document, but also they pose serious impli-
cations for the cultivation of a democratic culture 
and strengthening the rule of law’ (Madraiwiwi 
2013). The new constitution’s fatal flaw that may 
well be its undoing is that it lacks legitimacy, is not 
founded in popular will, but was decreed into exist-
ence after a façade of hurried public consultation. 
Commodore Bainimarama is convinced that he 
has completed the first phase of his ‘Glorious Revo-
lution’ that began in 2000 when he stamped out 
the George Speight insurrection. This is pure spin: 
there was no popular uprising against the elected 
government of the day, and there was nothing glori-
ous at all about the naked grab for power through 
a military coup. But in the absence of a free media, 
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the regime has had its way with words unchal-
lenged. The oxygen of free and unfettered speech 
in Fiji is in very short supply. In his address to the 
Certified Practising Accountants in Nadi in August 
2013, Bainimarama outlined what he hoped to 
accomplish when he began his journey: a just, fair 
and non-racial society where ‘everyone has a place 
in our national life’. ‘I am convinced that for all the 
challenges, history will eventually judge us favour-
ably,’ he said, ‘because our revolution — that’s what 
it is — has finally laid the foundations for a fairer, 
more equal society and the development of a mod-
ern, progressive state.’ There are many in Fiji who 
believe him, as they have believed him in the past, 
just as there are many who doubt his commitment 
to restoring the country back to true parliamentary 
democracy (Lawson 2012). Michael Green doubts if 
a genuinely democratic system will emerge in Fiji. 
‘At best, it will be a guided democracy, like Indo-
nesia’s under Suharto or perhaps Singapore’s under 
the Lee dynasty’ (2013, 270) Professor Yash Ghai is 
also among the sceptics. ‘I doubt if he [Bainimara-
ma] has read the constitution. He just repeats what 
his Attorney General tells him’ (Australia News 
Network 23/10/13). Commodore Bainimarama as 
an empty vessel for his attorney-general’s agenda 
is a sobering thought, but it is a thought shared by 
many in Fiji.
Fiji’s problems are as much constitutional 
as they are political. In the end, even a deeply 
flawed constitution can be made to work if there 
is a will to do so. But will the military relinquish 
power voluntarily? Will it respect rather than pre-
empt the verdict of the ballot box when the time 
comes? Does Commodore Bainimarama have the 
taste and temperament for the cut and thrust of 
robust democratic debate? Can he negotiate and 
compromise? His own record manifestly suggests 
otherwise, but he, like all of us, should be given 
the benefit of the doubt. The coup has succeeded, 
mainly through force and fear and other unsavoury 
means, to be sure; there has been violence, blood 
has been spilt, careers have been destroyed, and 
innocent citizens have suffered. The social and 
moral, not to say the economic costs, have been 
incalculable, but that it has now entrenched itself 
into the body politick of Fiji is beyond doubt. 
Commodore Bainimarama has summarily 
swept aside many institutions, structures and pro-
cesses of Fijian political life. Posterity may forgive 
his transgressions as unfortunate but inevitable 
acts necessary to wrench the country away from its 
hobbled past towards a new future; forgiven, that 
is, if he shows a largeness of mind and vision to rise 
above personal ambition for power to create a truly 
democratic, progressive, just and fair society in Fiji. 
It has been done before in Fiji and it can be done 
again. Frank Bainimarama is no Sitiveni Rabuka, 
lacking the latter’s intellectual agility, humility and 
a profound capacity for self-transformation and 
forgiveness. But he could still rise above the fray 
and effect a genuine political transformation, in the 
process earning an honourable place in Fijian his-
tory — not as a coup maker but as a maker of mod-
ern Fiji, as the progenitor of true representative 
parliamentary system of government rather than as 
the founder of a militarised democracy. That will 
be his opportunity and challenge and his legacy to 
the future generations For now, though, it is diffi-
cult to say whether the faint glow on the horizon is 
of a new dawn breaking or the glimmers of a dying 
funeral pyre. 
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